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COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION-THE SERVICE
CONNECTION STANDARD IN CONFUSION
PAUL J. RICE*
In a speech entitled "The Bill of Rights and the
Military," I former Chief Justice Earl Warren dis-
cussed the problems arising from the existence of a
large standing army. His purpose was to examine
the "role to be assigned the military in a demo-
cratic society." 2 He noted that our government
was founded upon "traditional subordination of
military to civil power," and that "with minor
exceptions, military men throughout our history
have not only recognized and accepted this re-
lationship in the spirit of the Constitution, but
that they have also cheerfully cooperated in
pursuing it." I
The Chief Justice discussed the role of the
Supreme Court in resolving conflicts between the
Bill of Rights and military discipline. He empha-
sized the existence of one acceptable conflict in
particular-that the role of constitutional courts
remains limited when the military is dealing with
its own personnel. The Supreme Court has gen-
erally held that it lacks jurisdiction to review de-
cisions of military courts.4 The motivation for this
"hands-off" attitude rests on strong historical
precedent. "The tradition of our country, from the
time of the Revolution until now, has supported
the military establishment's broad power to deal
with its own personnel." 5
This long-standing policy, reaffirmed with the
comments of the Chief Justice, lay largely un-
challenged6 before O'Callahan v. Parker.7 Indeed,
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' Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 181 (1962).
2 Id. at 182.3 1d. at 186.4 See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243
(1863). When the Court has released prisoners con-
victed by court-martial it has based its action upon
lack of military jurisdiction over the person. See Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).5 Warren, supra note 1 at 187.6 One article challenging the military's authority
was Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing
Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Jursdi ton,
13 Vqmm. L. REv. 435 (1960). See also Note, O'Callahan
v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969): New Lmitatiotns on
little had occurred in the field of military law to
prepare the system for the shock of O'Callahan.
Army Sergeant James F. O'Callahan left his
duty station with an evening pass. Dressed in
civilian clothes, O'Callahan forced his way into a
hotel room and seized a sleeping fourteen year old
girl. An attempted sexual attack upon the young-
ster was unsuccessful. He was immediately
apprehended by a hotel security guard and was
returned to military authorities. After interroga-
tion, he confessed.
He was charged with attempted rape,8 house-
breaking,9 and assault with intent to commit
rape.'0 A general court-martial tried the case and
found him guilty as charged. The Army imposed a
sentence of dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all
pay, and confinement at hard labor for ten years.
The conviction was affirmed by an Army Board of
Review, and the United States Court of Military
Appeals later denied a petition for review."
Court Martial Jurisdiction, 61 J. Cmy. L.C. & P.S.
195 (1970).
7395 U.S. 258 (1969).
8 Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 80, 10
U.S.C. § 880 (1968) [hereinafter cited as U.C.M.J.].9 U.C.M.J. art. 130, 10 U.S.C. § 930 (1968).0 oU.C.M.J. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1968).1 United States v. O'Callahan, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 800
(1957). There are five steps in the review of a general
court-martial. The first review is- by the convening
authority under the U.C.MJ. art. 60. The convening
authority is the commanding officer of a unit. He sub-
mits the case to the Battalion judge Advocate General
who issues an opinion under Art. 61 of the U.C.M.J.
After rereading the transcript, the convening authority
can review the facts, pass on the appropriateness of
the sentence, reduce the penalty, or chnge the finding
to "not guilty."
Next, the case goes to the office of the Judge Advo-
cate General under Art. 66. He reviews the case but
has no real power to change the finding of the lower
court.
The Court of Military Review is the third step in the
appeals structure. It is composed of three qualified
lawyers, officers or civilians serving short terms. The
appeal is automatic when the death penalty is imposed.
Under Art. 66(c), they weigh evidence, judge credi-
bility of witnesses, and determine controverted ques-
tions of fact.
The fourth step in the military appeal structure is
the United States Military Court of Appeals. Art. 67,
U.C.M.J., established the court which is composed
of three civilians sitting for fifteen year terms. The
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In April 1966,"2 O'Callahan petitioned the
United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging that the court-martial had no jurisdiction
to try him for a non-military offense committed
while on leave." The district court refused to con-
sider that issue since O'Callahan had formerly ob-
tained an unfavorable ruling from the district court
in Massachusetts where he had once been con-
fined. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the Pennsyl-
vania court without discussion of the question."
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts by holding that the
crimes for which O'Callahan was convicted were
not "service connected," and therefore not triable
by court-martial. 6
accused must petition for review but the court must
hear every request for review involving capital sen-
tences. Generally review is limited to matters of law
by Art. 69(d), but under extreme conditions it can
hear mixed questions of law and fact.
The President as commander-in-chief holds final
appellate authority. But he, as any other appeal body,
cannot increase the court-martial sentence. M. ComsKY
& L. AporTaAxz, CamiNA. Pxocx Eua i T
UNITED STATES DisTRIcT AND MITARY CouRTs, 172
ff (1963).
"O'Callahan was sentenced in 1956, paroled in
1960, and returned to confinement in 1962 as a parole
violator. See O'Callahan v. Attorney Gen., 230 F.
Supp. 766 (D. Mass. 1964).
1'The other allegations unsuccessfully raised in the
writ were: (a) that his confession, which had been ad-
mitted in evidence without objection, had been ob-
tained by use of coercion; (b) that testimony by use of
written interrogatories had been admitted into evi-
dence violating his sixth amendment right to con-
frontation of witnesses; (c) that his conviction by two-
thirds vote rather than by unanimity violated his
consitutional right to trial by jury. United States ex rel
O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa.
1966).
"1 United States ex rel O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F.
Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966). 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1948)
permits, in part, a district judge to refuse to entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus where a prior
application on the same grounds has been denied
pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States.
Chief Judge Wyzanski had denied the Massachusetts
writ of habeas corpus stating "there is no merit in
plaintiff's position, which conflicts with an unbroken
line of contrary authority." O'Callahan v. United
States Marshal, 293 F. Supp. 441, 442 0D. Mass. 1966).
"6 United States ex rel O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d
360 (3d Cir. 1968). Judge Hastie relied upon Thompson
v. Willingham, 318 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963) in deter-
mining that the court-martial had jurisdiction. Thomp-
son had alleged that a military court held no jurisdic-
tion over him for a capital offense in time of peace.
16O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). The
Court defined the issue as follows:
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of
War, Tit. 10 U.S.C. § 801 el seq., have jurisdiction
to try a member of the Armed Forces who is
Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas
emphasized that the offenses in question were
committed off duty and off post by a soldier
dressed in civilian garb. O'Callahan's conduct, it
was held, represented a "civilian" offense against a
civilian victim. In establishing no service connec-
tion,17 the majority further noted that peacetime
offenses were involved which had been "committed
within our territorial limits, not an occupied zone
of a foreign country." '8
The Court ignored the government's contention
that status as a member of the Armed Forces
granted military jurisdiction. As Mr. Justice
Douglas phrased it,
That is merely the beginning of the inquiry, not
its end. Status is necessary for jurisdiction; but it
does not follow that ascertainment of status com-
pletes the inquiry, regardless of nature, time, and
place of the offense.19
The majority compared military tribunals with
federal courts and concluded that courts-martial
are not entitled "to rank along with Article Im
courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of
people charged with offenses for which they can
be deprived of their life, liberty, or property." 20
It was asserted that "a court-martial is not yet an
charged with commission of a crime cognizable in
a civilian court and having no military significance
alleged to have been committed off-post and while
on leave, thus depriving him of his constitutional
rights to indictment by a grand jury and trial by
a petit jury in a civilian court?
395 U.S. at 261. The U.C.M.J. replaced the Articles
of War in 1951. Act of May 5, 1950, 64 Stat. 108.
It was a 5-3 decision. Together with Justice Douglas
in the majority stood Chief Justice Warren and Jus-
tices Black, Brennan and Marshall.
1" O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969).11 Id. at 273-74.
19 Id. at 267.
0 Id. at 262. In that comparison, the Court observed
that federal judges are appointed for life and that their
salaries may not be diminished, whereas their mili-
tary counterparts do not have the benefit of such
constitutional protections. Military judges, it was
asserted, are subject to the "will of the executive de-
partment which appoints, supervises and ultimately
controls them." Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
The Court frowned on a military system in which the
guilt of a soldier can be established by two-thirds of
the court-martial as compared to the civilian system
in which a unanimous jury decision is required for a
finding of guilty. Finally, the Court noted the unique
character of the authority vested by the militaryjudicial system in the officer who convenes a court-
martial-in particular the power he holds to appoint
not only members of the court but counsel for both




independent instrument of justice" 21 and that
Anglo-American history supported the proposition
that a soldier could not be tried by court-martial
for civilian type offenses. 22 The conclusion of the
Court naturally followed:
[A soldier's] crime to be under military jurisdiction
must be service-connected, lest "cases arising in.
the land and naval forces or in the militia, when
in actual service in time of war or public danger,"
as used in the Fifth Amendment, be expanded to
deprive every member of the armed services of
the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and
a trial by a jury of his peers.P
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Stewart
and White, strongly dissented. Harlan asserted
that the majority had usurped Congress's consti-
tutional power to determine the "appropriate sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of courts-martial." 24 He
objected to the majority's interpretation of his-
torical precedents. In his view, "English constitu-
tional history provide[d] scant support" for the
Court's position. Furthermore, "pertinent Ameri-
can history" was "quite the contrary." 26 He felt
that if the majority insisted on balancing govern-
mental interests, the interests on both sides should
have been examined including that of the military.
That, he insisted, the Court has not done. Lastly,
his dissent decried the confusion created by the
Court's failure to explain the scope of service
connected crimes. "Absolutely nothing," he added,
"in the language, history, or logic of the Constitu-
tion justifie[d] the uneasy state of affairs which the
Court ... created." 
2 6
Mr. Justice Douglas assumed solid support for
his opinion in the pre-revolutionary English and
early American law. He referred to the Crown's
abuses of court-martial power in 17th century
England which had prompted Parliament to seize
21 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
22 See notes 27-35 infra. and accompanying text.
23 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969).
4 Id. at 276. Congress's power derives from the
language of Art. I, sec., 8, cl. 14 of the Constitution
which grants to Congress the power "to make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces." In Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960), that constitutional language was reviewed and
the assertion made that military jurisdiction was based
upon whether a person could be regarded as falling
within the term "land and naval forces." Id. at 241.
Given the constitutional language, it would be for
Congress and not the Judiciary to determine subject
matter jurisdiction of courts-martial. See Coleman v.
Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1879).
25 O'Callalmn v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 276 (1969).
26Id. at 284.
the power to define court-martial jurisdiction
Douglas argued that Parliament's seizure of that
authority mirrored its "disapproval of the general
use of military courts for trial of ordinary
crimes." 2 He acknowledged that the Mutiny Act
of 17209 allowed martial trial of common law
felonies, but treated the Act as an exception to the
British rule "that a soldier could not be tried by
court-martial for a civilian offense." 3 0
With the acceptance of the Bill of Rights in
1688,1 authority to control the Army was vested
in Parliament.P But conflict continued between
Crown and legislature as to where. jurisdiction
over the Army rested.33 Justice Harlan's dissent
27Parliament exercised its authority through the
passage of annual mutiny acts the first of which
(enacted in 1689) read:
Noe Man may be forejudged of Life or Limbe, or
subjected to any kinde of punishment by Martiall
Law or in any other manner than by the Judgment
of his Peeres and according to the knowne and
Established Laws of this Realme.
1 W. & M., c.5 (1689).
2 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 268 (1969).
9 The act provided that a soldier could be court-
martialed for
any violence or Offense against the Person, Estate,
or Property of any of the Subjects of this Kingdom
which is punishable by the known Laws of the
Land.
Civil authorities could within eight days of the conduct
in question request that the accused soldier be turned
over to them for trial. Such requests had to be honored.
7 G o. 1, c.6 (1720).
0 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 269 (1969).
31 For a discussion of the Bill of Rights see generally
F. MAiTLAN, THE CONS=UTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND (1908).
n See Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Stand-
ing Army: Another Problem of Court-Marlial Juris-
diction, 13 VAND. L. Rzv. 442-43 (1960). Having seized
authority, Parliament moved with the passage of the
first Mutiny Act (1 W. & M., c.5) to limit court-martialjurisdiction to three offenses-mutiny, sedition and
desertion. See W. WINTHRoP, MnriARY LAW AND
PRECEDNTiS 18-19 & 929-30 (2d ed. 1920). Later,
however, Parliament initiated a series of legislative
measures expanding allowable court-martial authority.
First, it authorized courts-martial of soldiers overseas
in time of peace. See Duke & Vogel, supra. at 444.
Then, the Crown was granted the power to prescribe
articles of war which were to be operative within the
Kingdom as well as overseas. See W. WinTHRoP, supra.
at 20. A Mutiny Act of 1720 led to even broader mili-
tary jurisdiction allowing court-martial for British
soldiers committing common law felonies if within
eight days subsequent to an offense civilian officials
had not themselves asserted jurisdiction. 7 GEo. 1, c.6(1720).
uIt has been suggested that the seeds of the con-
flict rested with the very nature of martial law itself.
For martial law, which is built upon no settled
principles, but is entirely arbitrary n its decisions,
is... m truth and reality no law, but something
indulged rather than allowed as a law.




in O'Callahan analyzed that conflict. He noted
that "the King's asserted prerogative to try
soldiers by court-martial in time of peace" was one
point of contention in the "long standing...
struggle for power between the military and the
Crown on the one hand and Parliament on the
other." 14 The fact that military law proved so
harsh, he argued, made it understandable that a
Parliament vested with exclusive authority over
the military would use it sparingly. 5 Harlan con-
cluded that in that tradition control of the military
must remain in the hands of the people through
their representatives in Congress. The adoption of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 represented Ameri-
can affirmation of that principle, for it vested in
Congress authority "[tlo make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval Forces."
The O'Callahan majority pointed to early in-
stances of the assertion of legislative control over
the military as precedence for its contemporary
move to restrict court-martial jurisdiction. In
particular, reference was made to the Articles of
War of 1776.36
That act did require that the soldier accused of a
civilian offense be delivered to a civil magistrate,
but only after a request had been made for such
delivery. When no request was received from
civilian authorities, the commanding officer was
required to insure that disciplinary action was
taken against his officers and men for the offenses
in question. Indeed, if an officer failed to intitiate
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 276 (1969).
81 Id. at 276.31 Those articles were passed by the Continental
Congress.
37 Sec. X, Art. 1 of the Articles of War of 1776 read:
When any officer or soldier shall be accused of a
crime, or of having used violence, or committed any
offense against the persons or property of the good
people of any of the United American States, such
as is punishable by the known laws of the land, the
commanding officer and officers of every regiment,
troop, or party, to which the person or persons so
accused shall belong, are hereby required upon
application duly made by or in behalf of the party
or parties injured, to use his utmost endeavor to
deliver over such accused person or persons to the
civil magistrate; and likewise to be aiding and
assisting to the officers of justice in apprehending
and securing such person or persons so accused, in
order to bring them to a trial. If any commanding
officer or officers shall wilfully neglect or shall
refuse, upon the application aforesaid, to deliver
over such accused person or persons to the civil
magistrates, or to be aiding and assisting to the
officers of justice in apprehending such person or
persons, the officer or officers so offending shall be
cashiered.
W. Wn mn os, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENuS 964-
65 (2d ed. 1920).
such action, he was compelled to stand court-
martial himself for the crimes committed by his
subordinate. s  The commanding officer was
ordered to charge the accused under a general
article of war enacted in 177519 which sanctioned
military punishment for "all crimes [by service-
men] not capital." 40 The 1776 legislation, then,
requiring delivery of an accused to civil authorities
in no way limited court-martial jurisdiction when
civil application for such delivery was not forth-
coming.
Furthermore, historical precedent indicates that
civilian offenses have long been tried by courts-
martial. An appendix to the Government's brief
cited over 100 instances of military punishment
applied to non-military crimes tried between 1775
and 1815.41 Justice Douglas challenged the import
of that list asserting that "in almost every case
summarized, it appears that some special military
interest existed." 4 He termed the crimes involved
peculiarly military-prosecutions for abuse of
military position, crimes involving officers, and
courts-martial held in wartime between 1773 and
1783.41 Yet, he ignored those additional cases which
did not fall into one of the above categories.
Indeed, the Douglas attempt to discredit the
's Every officer commanding in quarters, garrison,
or on a march, shall keep good order, and, to
the utmost of his power, redress all such abuses
or disorders which may be committed by any
officer or soldier under his command; if, upon
complaint made to him of officers or soldiers
beating or otherwise ill-treating any person; or
disturbing fairs or markets; of committing any
kind of riots to the disquieting of the good people
of the United States; he the said commander who
shall refuse or omit to see justice is done on the
offender or offenders, and reparation made to
the party or parties injured, as far as part of the
offender's pay shall enable him or them, shall,
upon proof thereof, be punished, by a general
court-martial, as if he himself had committed the
crimes or disorders complained of. Articles of
War 1776, § IX, Art. 1.
W. Wnqrrop, supra note 37 at 964.
"The General Article remained structurally con-
sistent from 1775 to 1916:
All crimes, not capital, and all disorders and
neglects, which officers and soldiers may be guilty
of, to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline, though not mentioned in the articles of
war, are to be taken cognizance of by a general
or regimental court-martial, according to the nature
and degree of the offense, and be punished at
their discretion.
W. WNqTRoP, supra note 37 at 957.
40 O'Calahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 271 (1969).
41 Brief for Respondent at 35-52, O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
42 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 270 n.7 (1969).
4 Id. at 270 n.7.
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Government's list was not persuasive, for some of
those cases failed to fit any of the Justice's cate-
gories. One case, for instance, involved "killing a
cow, stealing fowls, and stealing geese;" 44 an-
other "stealing a horse from the Widow Dun-
can." 41 Others arose from "beating a woman kept
as a mistress," 46 the "beating [of] a Mr. Williams
... living near [a] garrison," 7 and the use bf
"violence on Mrs. Cronkhyte, a citizen of the
United States." '8 Those offenses could not be de-
fined as "peculiarly military." Still, court-martial
disposition of them was allowed.
History belies the O'Caflahan majority's addi-
tional assertion that the 1777 General Article of
War failed to take cognizance of civilian crimes.
A noted military historian has written that crimes
were cognizable by a court-martial under the Gen-
eral Article only when "committed under such
circumstances as to have directly offended against
the government and discipline of the military
state." 49 However, he later commented that the
strict interpretation of the General Article had not
been realized in practice. As long as commanders
instituted courts-martial for crimes commited
against civilians, civil courts avoided such cases."
Support for the propriety of that broadened
approach to the authority of courts-martial over
soldiers received support with the Supreme
Court's comments on the "General Article" in
Grafton v. United States.
The crimes referred to in [the General] [A]rtice
manifestly embrace those not capital, committed
by officers or soldiers in violation of public law
as enforced by the civil power. No crimes com-
mitted by officers or soldiers of the Army are ex-
cepted by the... [A]rticle from the jurisdiction
thus conferred upon courts-martial except those
that are capital in nature .... EIThe jurisdiction of
" Brief for Respondent at 41, O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258 (1969).
" Id. at 43.
41 Id. at 43.
7Id. at 49.
48Id. at 49. It is doubtful that Mr. Justice Douglas
would find service connection today for many of the
cases he summarily dismissed from the government's
list because of their "military significance." E.g., in a
case in which a soldier absented himself from camp
without leave and rioted in Cincinnati, the fact that
the soldier was AWOL at the time he was arrested for
his role in the civil disturbance in question would
hardly be sufficient grounds for a finding of service
connection. Brief for Respondent at 43, O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
49 W. Wnrmop, M=Any LAw AND PRECEDENTS
723-24 (2d ed. 1920).
0 Id. at 725.
general courts-martial [is] ... concurrent with that
of the civil courts. 1
The Supreme Court had, prior to O'Callahan,
consistently treated the military status of an ac-
cused as sufficient "service connection" to justify
court-martial jurisdiction. 52 While the particular
issue in O'Callahan had never been decided, a
reading of the earlier opinions set out below raises
a strong jresumption that a questioning of military
status as a valid jurisdictional base for courts-
martial had never been considered.
In Ex parte Milligan," the Supreme Court had
ruled that a military commission held no juris-
diction to try a civilian citizen of the State of
Indiana. The state had neither been under siege
nor engaged in rebellion at the time of the offense.
Federal courts were open and functioning. Never-
theless, comparing the constitutional guarantees of
civilians with those of military personnel the
Court stated,
The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the
army and navy required other and swifter modes
of trial than are furnished by the common law
courts; and, in pursuance of the power conferred
by the Constitution, Congress has declared the
kinds of trial, and the manner in which they shall be
conducted, for offenses committed while the party
is in the military or naval service. Every one con-
nected with these branches of the public service
is amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has
created for their government, and, while thus
serving, surrenders his right to be tried by the civil
courts."
The Court determined in Coleman v. Tennessee 5
that during the Civil War a hostile state had no
-1206 U.S. 333, 348 (1907).
5" See notes 53-58 infra. and accompanying text. It
was held that Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Con-
stitution granted to Congress "the power to provide for
the trial and punishment of military... offenses in a
manner ... practiced by civilized nations.. ." Dynes
v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857). Further-
more, the Court had ruled that the language of the
fifth amendment excepted "cases arising in the land
and naval forces" from the right to indictment by grand
jury, and, by implication, from the sixth amendment
right to trial by jury. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S.
122; 127 (1950). Accord, Ex park Quinn, 317 U.S. 1,40 (1942).
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
"Id. at 123. The government was asserting juris-
diction over Milligan under martial law which may be
imposed when the civil courts cannot function because
of invasion, rebellion or some other disorder. See
Everett, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians, 1960
Du=n L.J. 366, 366-67 (1960).
8 97 U.S. 509 (1878).
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jurisdiction over a member of the occupying army.
In holding that the Army possessed exclusive
jurisdiction the Court asserted,
As Congress is expressly authorized by the Con-
stitution "to raise and support armies," and "to
make rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces," its control over the
whole subject of the formation, organization and
government of the national armies, including
therein the punishment of offenses committed by
persons in the military service, would seem to be
plenary6A
As recently as 1960, the case of Kinsella v.
United States7 forwarded military status as the
jurisdictional foundation for the power of courts-
martial over members of the Armed Forces.
The test for jurisdiction... is one of status,
namely whether the accused in the court-martial
proceeding is a person who can be regarded as
falling within the term "land and naval forces." M
The O'Callahan majority attempted to over-
come the weight of such precedents. 9 Difficult to
deny, however, was the reality of a tradition of
military justice in the United States based upon an
understanding that Article I, Section 8, Clause
14 empowered Congress to establish discipline for
citizens "in the land and naval forces." Military
status was accepted as the Congressionally sanc-
tioned jurisdictional test for courts-martial. "To
say that military jurisdiction defies definition in
terms of military status [would be] to [deny the
import of] unambiguous language [in] ... Clause
6 1 Id. at 514. In a later case, Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1942), the Court affirmed a military trial for
servicemen who attempted sabotage in the United
States in wartime. The basis for military jurisdiction
was examined with the Court concluding that the Con-
stitution
authorized the trial by court-martial of the mem-
bers of our Armed Forces for all that class of crimes
which under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
might otherwise have been deemed triable in the
civil courts. The [crimes so triable] are not restricted
to those offenses against the law of war alone, but
extend to trial of all offenses, including crimes
which were of the class traditionally triable by jury
at common law. Id. at 43
'7361 U.S. 234 (1960). The Court concluded that
the military lacked jurisdiction to court-martial
civilian dependents accompanying the Armed Forces
overseas.
18 Id. at 240-41.
59 The Court's approach led one commentator to
observe that "the majority opinion in O'Callahan must
be viewed as a triumph of abstract concept over
practical realities." Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-
Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice, 1960 DuxE
L.J. 853, 867 (1969).
14." 60 Yet, the Court decided in O'Callahan to for-
ward a new interpretation of that language. The
majority reasoned in part upon a distrust of and
an aversion to military justice.
Justice Douglas asserted that courts-martial
afford only "so called justice." a He compared the
civilian trial "held in an atmosphere conducive to
the protection of individual rights" with the
military trial "marked by the age old manifest
destiny of retributive justice." 62 He condemned
the entire court-martial institution as being
"singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties
of constitutional law." 6
That disparagement of military justice over-
looked a history of adjustments by the court-
martial system to insure protection of the accused's
basic rights. Military police and criminal investi-
gators, as part of their standard procedure, were
advising suspects of their right to remain silent
long before Miranda.64 The exclusionary rule was
being applied by courts-martial in search and
seizure cases before Mapp v. Ohio and Lee v.
Florida applied the rule to the state civil courts. 65
The military furnished counsel for indigent de-
fendants years before Gideon v. Wainwright", re-
quired state courts to do likewise. Indeed, courts-
martial jurisdiction presented an unexpected tar-
get for judicial attack since military tribunals
have stood with the vanguard in moving to insure
the rights of the accused.
One wonders, in light of the Court's attack,
whether there is any justification for the military
judicial system. The answer remains clear. The
military holds a vested interest in deterring the
commission of crimes by soldiers regardless of
where they are perpetrated. The discipline, morale,
and integrity of our Armed Forces are at stake."
10 Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234,243 (1960).61 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 n.7
(1969).62 Id. at 266.
6Id. at 265.
14 Compare U.C.M.J. art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1968),
with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). After
Miranda, the Court of Military Appeals required all
suspects to be advised of their right to free counsel at
all custodial interrogations irrespective of their ability
to hire an attorney. United States v. Tempia, 16
U.S.C.M.A. 629 (1967).
65 Compare MAxuAL FOR CoimRs-MARrAL, para.
152, which has been substantially the same since 1951
will Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Lee v.
Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
66 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
67 Moreover, when civilian courts assume jurisdic-
tion over a member of the military, he becomes in-
effective as a soldier until the conclusion of his case. If
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In its distrust of military justice, the majority
stressed the significance of affording the uniformed
defendant two right's of the accused civilian-
indictment by grand jury and jury trial. The Court
failed to recognize that a grand jury would provide
questionable advantage to the accused serviceman.
The grand jury procedure often represents an
oppressive tool of the prosecutox" since such pro-
ceedings are held in secrecy without the presence
of the accused or his counsel. The same cannot be
said of the military equivalent-the Article 4269
investigation. The article provides that prior to
each general court-martial a thorough hearing
must be conducted at which the accused may be
present and represented by counsel. 1 The in-
vestigating officer must call all available witnesses
whom the accused is entitled to cross-examine'
his unit or vessel is alerted and relocated, he will be
left behind. Military courts dispose of cases swiftly
with punishment for guilt often leaving the soldier in
a duty status encouraging his rehabilitation.
A defendant found guilty would be retained in duty
status under any of the following sentences: reprimand
or admonishment; restriction; hard labor without
confinement; forfeiture, fine or detention of pay; and
reduction in rank. MAxu~A roR COURTs-MART=L,
para. 126 (1969).
Army statistics for 1967 indicate that 85% of the
cases involving serious offenses committed off post were
retained by the civilian authorities. Brief for Respond-
ent at 27 n.16, O'Callaban v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258(1969). The other 15%, probably involving defendants
with the best potential for rehabilitation, will be the
ones affected by the O'Callahan limitation upon mili-
tary jurisdiction.
'8See Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted
Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965).
19 Article 32 reads in part as follows:
No charge or specification may be referred to a
general court-martial for trial until a thorough
and impartial investigation of all the matters set
forth therein has been made. This investigation
shall include inquiry as to the truth of the matter
set forth in the charges, consideration of the form
of the charges, and a recommendation as to the
disposition which should be made of the case in the
interest of justice and discipline
U.C.MJ. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1968).
70The accused shall be advised of the charges
against him and of his right to be represented
at that investigation by counsel. Upon his own
request he shall be represented by civilian coun-
sel if provided by him, or military counsel of
his own selection if such counsel is reasonably
available, or by counsel detailed by the officer
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over
the command.
U.C.M.J. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1968).
n It is not the function of the investigating offi-
cer to perfect a case against the accused, but
to ascertain and impartially weigh all available
facts in arriving at his conclusion.
MANUAL FOR COUMrS-MARTIAL, para. 34 at 7-9.
The suspect himself may call witnesses, enter evi-
dence, or testify on his own behalf.2
Trial by jury may seem most desirable as well.
But is the accused serviceman a peer of the com-
munity just outside the gate? In Orloff v. Wil-
loughby,73 the Court acknowledged that "the
military constitutes a specialized community
governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian." 74 The soldier does not choose where he
is to be stationed. Many times local civilian in-
habitants house antagonism toward members of
the military who are stationed near their commu-
nity, especially those of different ethnic or racial
backgrounds. Jury trial, then, may well provide
no benefit to the serviceman accused of criminal
conduct far from his home.
The Judiciary's call for new restrictions on
court-martial jurisdiction was based upon a dis-
trust of the military judicial system coupled with
the expressed need to afford certain military de-
fendants the civil amenities of grand jury and
jury trial proceedings. Disagreement over the
strength of such arguments as the basis for the
overthrow of well established principles of military
jurisdiction continued unabated. No more satis-
factory was the fact that the O'Callahan opinion
left unexplained the new jurisdictional standard.
What were the proper bounds of "service con-
nected" crime?
Justice Harlan, alarmed by the majority's
failure to define "service connection", proclaimed,
Whatever role an ad hoc judicial approach may
have in some areas of the law, the Congress and
the military are at least entitled to know with
some certainty the allowable scope of court-
martial jurisdictionY7
The extent of confusion over jurisdictional stand-
ards in the wake of O'Callahan soon became ap-
parent.
The Court of Military Appeals quickly initiated
the task of interpreting the decision and handling
72 At that investigation full opportunity shall be
given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses
against him if they are available and to present
anything he may desire in his own behalf, either
in defense or mitigation, and the investigating
officer shall examine available witnesses re-
quested by the accused.
U.C.MJ. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1968). See also
MANuAL FOR CouTS-MARTiAL, para. 34 at 7-10 &
7-I1.
354 U.S. 83 (1953).74 Id. at 94.75O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 284 (1969).
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its jurisdictional uncertainties. In United States v.
Borys78, that court first indicated how it would
respond to the O'Callahan ruling.
Army Captain Stephen Borys had been tried
and convicted by court-martial in a case similar on
its facts to O'Callahan.' Like defendant O'Calla-
han, Borys was found guilty of a rape attempted
while off duty and dressed in civilian clothes.n
The comparison with O'Callahan satisfied the
majority that service connection was not present
leaving court-martial jurisdiction invalid. The
military court's conviction was reversed with
charges dismissed.
The Borys opinion represented a mechanical
application of O'Callahan principles. Judge Fergu-
son, speaking for the majority, envisioned no basis
for distinguishing Borys from the earlier case. The
fact that in both instances civilian courts were
open, that the situs of the conduct in question was
not territory under siege, an armed camp or a
distant military outpost convinced the majority
that the fact situations were indistinguishable. As
Judge Ferguson phrased it,
(the] accused's military status was only a hap-
penstance of chosen livelihood... none of his acts
were service connected under any test or standard
set out by the Supreme Court. In short, they, like
O'Ca~lahan's, were the very sort remanded to the
appropriate civil jurisdiction in which indictment
by grand jury and trial by petit jury could be af-
forded the defendant.79
Chief Judge Quinn, in dissent, questioned what
he termed the majority's application of O'Callaltan
"by rote." 3 0 He asserted that before the military
could be precluded from trying its own personnel
the offense in question would have to be both
cognizable in a federal civilian court and marked
by a lack of military significance. He insisted that
the Supreme Court in O'Callahan had looked to
the fact that the offenses in issue there had oc-
curred in the Federal Territory of Hawaii prior to
statehood. The federal government in such terri-
76 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547 (1969).
7 Borys had been charged with rape, robbery,
sodomy and attempted rape in violation of U.C.M.J.
arts. 120, 122, 125, and 80 respectively.
8Borys' crime, like that of O'Callahan, could be
termed "civilian" in nature. In fict, the accused had
been tried and acquitted by a civil court in Aiken,
South Carolina of seven of twelve counts against him.
See United States v. Borys, 39 C.M.R. 608, 611 (1968).79 United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 549(1969).80Id. at 550.
tory possessed criminal jurisdiction over both
civilian and military personnel. As Quinn viewed
it, O'Callahan stood for the narrow principle that
Congress in exercising that federal authority
could not prescribe different forums for the prose-
cution of a civilian and military man's misconduct
unless the service member's offense was service
connected.
Quirn's dissent noted that defendant Borys'
offenses had occurred off base in Georgia and South
Carolina. He stressed the fact that federal and
state governments remained separate sovereigns
vested with authority to determine what action
would be criminal within their jurisdictions. That
a state criminal code declared a particular act
criminal in no way limited the federal power of
Congress to grant to the military jurisdiction over
its personnel responsible for such criminal con-
duct.81 Quinn reasoned that Borys' offenses were
not cognizable in a civilian court since civilian
court as used in O'Callahan meant federal court.P
Furthermore, the dissent viewed Borys' mis-
conduct as militarily significant tolling service
connection. Congress, it was argued, had exercised
its power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 to
make rules for government and regulation of the
Armed Forces in order to afford federal protection
of the civilian population from the military.
Congress sanctioned courts-martial for that pur-
pose. Military status of an accused in his alleged
misconduct toward a civilian would properly
precipitate court-martial action in light of Con-
gress's jurisdictional grant.P
81 Chief Judge Quinn compared the carnal knowledge
(statutory rape) statutes in the State of Florida-
".. unmarried person, of previous chaste character
... under the age of eighteen years," FRA. STAT. ANx.
tit. 44, § 794.05(1) (1961); and in the State of Hawaii-
"... with any female under the age of sixteen years,"
HAwAu REv. STAT. tit. 38, § 768.62 (1955); with the
military counterpart-"... has not attained the age
of sixteen years." U.C.M.J. art. 120(b), 10 U.S.C.
§ 920(b) (1968). If the girl involved in a rape case were
fifteen and not of previously chaste character, the
offense would be cognizable in a Hawaii court but not
in Florida. Quinn, assuming arguendo that "cognizable
in a civilian court" meant either state or federal court,
showed that the military would be able to court-martial
the service member in Florida but not Hawaii. That
would mean that the ability of Congress to exercise
its enumerated constitutional power over the military
would, in fact, be controlled in part by each state's
determination as to what acts are criminal in that
state. United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547,
556-7 (1969).
82United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 557(1969).8i Id. at 557-60. The dissent in Borys, then, joined
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In reality the dissent in Borys represented an
initial attempt to place a precise definition upon
the term service connection.13 A majority of the
Court of Military Appeals soon took up the task a
minority had begun in Borys. Results of that ef-
fort revealed a tendency to assume much from an
opinion (O'Callahan) that offered little in terms of
specific guidelines.
The Supreme Court had stated that O'Calla-
hans "offenses did not involve any question of...
the security of a military post." 85 The question
then arose-what if defendant O'Callahan's
attempted rape had occured on a military post?
Would his status plus occurrence of the offense
upon a military installation permit trial by court-
martial? The Court of Military Appeals answered
affirmatively8 The situs of a serviceman's crimi-
nal conduct was termed one factor in resolving
the service connection question. Authority to
govern its own posts invested the military with
authority to act in insuring their safety. Crimes
committed on base were to be dealt with by a
court-martial.
This standard was invoked in United Stakes v.
Crapo.P Defendant Crapo stood convicted of
robbery and attempted robbery. His two victims
were taxicab drivers. One was attacked on a
military reservations and the other in Seattle,
Washington. On appeal, court-martial conviction
that of O'Cailahan in decrying judicial assault upon the
traditional scope of court-martial jurisdiction.
84The jurisdictional watchword in O'Callakan re-
mained largely undefined. The Court's creation of the
"service connection" standard was not designed to
question court-martial jurisdiction over many cases.
The military's authority to court-martial a soldier for
desertion or for wilful disobedience of the lawful order
of a superior officer remained unchallenged. But con-
cern arose as to designation of the proper forum to
handle cases involving servicemen's crimes in which
"service connection", or the lack thereof, was not so
clear.
85 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 274 (1969).8 See United States v. Henderson, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
601 (1969) and United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
609 (1969). Defendants Henderson and Smith were
court-martialed and convicted .of rape in separate
trials. Their victims were the daughters of fellow ser-
vicemen. Henderson lured the one girl to his quarters
off post, while Smith took a girl to his quarters on
post. Henderson's conviction was reversed by the
appeals court while Smith's conviction was affirmed.
The court acknowledged that the cases differed "in only
one respect-the place where the offense occurred."
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 609 (1969).
- 18 U.S.C.M.A. 594 (1969).
8 The driver was struck over the head on the reser-
vation but was forced to drive off the base before de-
fendant Crapo took his money. Id. at 595-96.
for the attempted robbery in Seattle was reversed.
Conviction for the on-base offense was affirmed.8 9
The situs criterion if strictly applied would bring
within court-martial jurisdiction cases which in no
way involved the security of a military post. For
instance, a serviceman's preparation of a fraudu-
lent income tax form or his forgery of a check to be
cashed off base would fit that category. That the
Court of Military Appeals may have established
too broad a standard proved no problem. Excep-
tions to that general jurisdictional rule were soon
recognized. 0
Furthermore, the broad general rule was work-
able. The Court of Military Appeals had recognized
that military trial and lower appellate courts were
awaiting guidelines to assist them in sorting out
the O'Callahan puzzle. Anything less than a
jurisdictional standard simple in application
would have left the lower courts in a continuing
state of uncertainty.9
Additional refinement in the definition of
"service connected" crime in terms of the situs of
the conduct in question came with the decision in
United States v. Kealon.9' Airman Keaton was
tried and convicted by general court-martial in the
Republic of the Philippines for the crime of assault
with intent to commit murder. He appealed
arguing that the purpose of O'Callahan was to
protect for servicemen the constitutional privi-
leges of indictment and trial by jury. The Court
of Military Appeals answered that such privileges
89 United States v. Crapo, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 594, 596
(1969). Accord United States v. Shockley, 18 U.S.
C.M.A. 610 (1969), where a conviction for sodomy
committed off post was reversed while conviction for
the same offense committed on post was affirmed.
United States v. Wiffliams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605 (1969),
where the offense of cashing a bad check on post was
held to be service connected while the cashing of
another at a civilian grocery store was not.90E.g., United States v. Castro, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
598 (1969), in which the Court of Military Appeals
held that the court-martial did not have jurisdiction
over an on post concealed weapon offense when the
facts indicated that the bringing of the weapon onto
the post was not a voluntary act. Castro had been in-jured in a traffic accident off post and was transported
to an Army hospital by military police. The weapon was
discovered at the hospital.
91 The Supreme Court may within the year rule on
a case that could affect even the situs criterion for
military jurisdiction. On February 27, 1970 the Court
granted certiorari on the issue of whether O'Callahan v.
Parker would bar a court-martial from trying a soldier
charged with committing rape and kidnapping against
civilians on a military post. Relford v. Commandant,
397 U.S. 934 (1970).9219 U.S.C.MA. 64 (1969).
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would only be available through the civil courts of
the United States. It noted that "military courts
[alone] are authorized to function within the Re-
public of the Philippines." 93 The Keaton court
stated that while some offenses committed abroad
are triable in the federal civilian courts, "the
number and kind of offenses in which such action
can be taken is limited." 91 The Supreme Court, it
was added, did not intend to proscribe court-
martial jurisdiction in friendly foreign countries.
Court-martial jurisdiction over defendants charged
with offenses in a foreign land represented a "valid
exercise of constitutional authority." 91
Specific offenses as well were found by their very
nature to be service connected. In United States v.
Beeker95, for instance, the Court of Military
Appeals reaffirmed jurisdictional guidelines for
treatment of drug cases involving military per-
sonnel.
Beeker had been convicted of numerous mari-
juana offenses-unlawful importation and trans-
portation; wrongful possession on a military
post; wrongful use off and on post.93 The court up-
held military jurisdiction over the accused for use
offenses both off and on base. It reasoned that drug
use anywhere by the military prejudiced the order
and discipline of the Armed Forces. A court-martial
was also held proper in instances of on base posses-
sion of marijuana consistent with the situs cri-
terion for jurisdiction established in Crapo.99
Subsequent cases extended the bounds of service
connection to cover off post use of heroin and
cocaine,' possession of dangerous drugs,' 0' and off
post transfer of drugs to another service member.j' 2
In addition, the petty offenses of military men
had long been tried by courts-martial. 3 O'Calla-
han's denial of military jurisdiction over cases in-
3Id. at 67.
9 Id. at 67.95 Id. at 67.
96 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563 (1969).
97In violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176(a).
98 In violation of U.C.M.J. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934
(1968).99 United States v. Crapo, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 954 (1969).
See notes 87-90 supra. and accompanying text.309 See United States v. Boyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 581
(1969).
101 See United States v. Castro, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 598(1969).
102 See United States v. Rose, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 3
(1969).
103 The exact limits upon the definition of a petty
offense are not certain, though it is generally held that
any crime carrying a maximum punishment of six
months is a petty offense. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373
(1966).
volving civilian type crimes not service connected
in no way disturbed the jurisdictional authority of
courts-martial in the petty offense realm.
The Court of Military Appeals in United States v.
Skarkey04 asserted the propriety of a petty offense
exception to the O'Callahan rule. The sole issue
before the court was whether the military held
jurisdiction to court-martial a marine for the of-
fense of drunk and disorderly conduct. 1 5 The court
noted that O'Callahan should be read "with an eye
to the important constitutional protections which
it sought to preserve," namely the benefits of
indictment and trial by jury.10 6 Emphasis was
placed on the fact that the Supreme Court itself
recognized no constitutional right to grand jury
indictment or jury trial in cases of petty offense.1
Under O'Callahan then, military trial of that type
of case would be entirely proper.
The Armed Forces gain much from continued
jurisdiction over petty offense cases. Courts-
martial expeditiously handle petty charges leaving
the uniformed defendant available for immediate
further duty. The slower civil court procedures
lead to undesirable delay: Holding O'Callahan in-
applicable to cases of petty offense relieved what
otherwise would have been a judicial hindrance to
efficient military operations.
Many crimes committed against fellow service-
men likewise fall outside the bounds of O'Callahan
applicability. The Court of Military Appeals first
defined that genre of crime as service connected in
United States v. Rego. s
Defendant Rego's court-martial conviction for
larceny was affirmed. The victim of the crime was
a fellow airman. The court relied on language of
the O'Callahan majority which had recognized
''assaults on and thefts from other soldiers" as
"peculiarly military crimes." 09
The Rego holding led the way for a broader rule
10419 U.S.C.M.A. 26 (1969).
105 The maximum penalty for the offense is confine-
ment at hard labor for six months and forfeiture of
two-thirds pay per month for a like period. MANUAL FOR
CouiTs-MRTrAL, para. 127(c).
100 United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 27(1969).
"07See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968);
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937);
Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
108 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9 (1969).
109 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 270 n.14
(1969). In Rego, Judge Ferguson of the United States
Court of Military Appeals dissented. He asserted that
the offense in question was not service connected. He
argued that service connection in such a case ought to
depend on whether the victim, a serviceman, had been
affected in the performance of his military duty.
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of court-martial jurisdiction over cases involving a
military defendant and a military victim.
[WI]here an offense cognizable under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice is perpetrated against
the person or property of another serviceman,
regardless of the circumstances, the offense is cog-
nizable by court-martial.110
Instances of abuse of military status also have
signaled court-martial jurisdiction in the wake of
O'Callahan. In particular, cases arose involving
servicemen's breach of faith placed in them by
businessmen in recognition of their military
identity. United States v. Peak,11' for example, up-
held a court-martial conviction for wrongful ap-
propriation of a motor vehicle 12 The accused
escaped from the post stockade and went to a used
car lot in a neighboring community. He was
dressed in fatigues and identified himself and his
military unit to the salesman. He was permitted to
take a car for a test drive, but never returned.
The court recognized that
such an abuse of a military status is likely to in-
fluence the extent of confidence by the public in
members of the Armed Forces. We believe the
impact of such abuse is direct and substantial
enough to provide the requisite service connection
for the Armed Forces to exercise jurisdiction over
the offense.1
Court-martial action in response to a marine's
forgery of a check while off base likewise received
approval on appeal."' The accused used his
military identification card in presenting the check.
The court held that the soldier utilized military
standing to facilitate commission of the crime.
Service connection, therefore, was presentuS
no United States v. Everson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 70, 71
(1969). This case involved the off post offenses of
assault with a dangerous weapon and careless discharge
of a firearm under circumstances such as to endanger
human life in violation of U.C.MJ. arts. 128 & 134,
10 U.S.C. §§ 928 & 934 (1968).
1 19 U.S.C.M.A. 19 (1969).
"2In violation of U.C.MJ. art. 121, 10 U.S.C. § 921
(1968).
reUnited States v. Peak, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 20-21
(1969).
"'See United States v. Frazier,. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 40
(1969).
"'1Dissenting opinions by Judge Ferguson in both
Peak and Frazier forwarded the view that discredit
upon the Armed Forces was not in issue. "Reliance on
one's status as a serviceman," he insisted, was not
"an element of the forgery offenses." United States v.
Frazier, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 40, 42 (1969). In another
forgery case, the court examined five checks holding
that one instance of forgery was service connected
The defendant in United States v. Frynzan"6 had
registered in a hotel under a ficticious name wear-
mng the uniform and insignia of a first lieutenant.
He amassed a $203.13 bill, advised the manage-
ment that he was on temporary duty with $600 in
back pay due to him, and left with credit granted.
A later conviction for wrongful and dishonorable
failure to pay that debt" 7 was affirmed. The court
stated that "positive misuse of [military] status
to secure privileges or recognition not accorded
others cause[d] the Armed Forces to have a sub-
stantial interest in punishing the abuse." u
Establishment of the bounds of service con-
nected crime involved not only demarcation of
those factors which would bring a case within the
standard, but also recognition of those that would
force one without. The Court of Military Appeals
has since O'Callahan specifically designated two
criteria upon which court-martial jurisdiction may
not be based.
The majority in O'Callahan had stated that
crimes committed by officers were traditionally
cognizable in military tribunals.11 9 Nothing more
was said. The Court of Military Appeals then
moved to specifically reject any implication that
the commissioned status of a defendant alone
tolled service connection. 20
The court also ruled that "the wearing of the
[military] uniform at the time of arrest" alone
because the check in question was cashed on a military
installation. The forgery of three others was service
connected because the endorsements contained the
accused's military address. The last forgery was held
to be cognizable in a civilian court because neither the
instrument nor other available evidence pointed to the
accused's use of military standing in cashing the check.
United States v. Halalan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 46 (1969).
nG 19 U.S.C.M.A. 71 (1969).
n7 In violation of U.C.MJ. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934(1968).
U8 United States v. Fryman, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 71, 73
(1969). In finding service connection in cases such as
Fryman the Court of Military Appeals appeared to
overlook one key question-was the victim's reliance
on the military status of the accused justifiable?
Justification for reliance on military status would ap-
pear sound in cases where the accused was dressed in
uniform or presented military identification. If, however.
a serviceman dressed in civilian clothes entered an off
post business establishment and represented himself as
a military man, justification for reliance on the mili-
tary status of the accused would seem weak.
"1 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 270 n.14
(1969).
120" United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 550-
51 (1969). Chief Judge Quinn, who dissented in Borys,
specifically rejected the implication that a crime by an
officer would be service connected while the same crime
committed by an enlisted man would not. The majority
in Borys rejected the theory by implication-the
opinion included no comment on the issue.
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would not confer jurisdiction on the courts-
martial l There as before the military court
responded to offer definition for the O'Callahan
pronouncement on military jurisdiction. Its con-
tinuous effort at refinement of the term "service
connection" precluded widespread confusion
within the military judicial system as to the course
of appropriate action in the O'Callahan era.
O'Callahan aroused more than confusion over
the extent of court-martial jurisdiction. Doubt
arose as well on the question whether courts could
apply the decision retroactively. Once again the
Court of Military Appeals stepped in to offer an
interim view" with the matter set for final resolu-
tion by the Supreme Court within the next year."3
The military court's decision forwarded at least
one approach available to the Supreme Court in
handling the issue.
Treatment of this matter arose in consideration
of the appeal of an officer from a rape conviction."4
Original proceedings in the case had become final
in August 1968. His petition for reconsideration
under O'Callahan was denied. The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals held that it would "apply the decision
[O'Callahan] only to those convictions that were
not final before June 2, 1969, the date of the...
decision."'2 The court acknowledged that it
opposed retroactivity save in cases subject to di-
rect review on the O'Callahan decision date. 6
The military court assumed the approach of the
1965 Linkletter v. Walkerm decision of the Supreme
Court where it was asserted that "the constitution
neither prohibits nor requires retrospective ef-
fect." " The military tribunal assumed that it
would have to determine whether retroactive or
prospective application was appropriate. As to
retroactive application of the new O'Callahan
standard for military jurisdiction, the court noted
that the issue could only be resolved by weighing
in balance
[t]he extent of the reliance of law enforcement
121 United States v. Armes, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 15, 16
(1969).
"'See Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264 (1970).
"'On February 27, 1970 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether O'Callahan v. Parker
should be applied retroactively. Relford v. Comman-
dant, 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
m Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264 (1970).
1 Id. at 265.
28 Id. at 265.
" 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Id. at 629. See Haddad, Retroactivity Should be
Rethought: A Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine,
60 J. Crmu. L.C. & P.S. 417 (1969), for a critical
analysis of Linkletter.
authorities on the old standards and the effect on
the administration of justice of a retroactive ap-
plication of the new standard. 1"
Decision against retroactivity came with the
tribunal's analysis of those two factors.
Congress, the military, and even the Supreme
Court had accepted or relied upon status as the
jurisdictional test prior to O'Callahan.Y° Courts-
martial had accepted cases through June of 1969
with a view to well established jurisdictional
principles. The Supreme Court, in DeSefano v.
Woods,"' stated that a decision would not be
applied retroactively if cases decided prior to
assertion of new principles of law had been handled
with good faith reliance upon past opinions of the
Court."' It would be difficult to argue that disposi-
tion by the military of the type of case later af-
fected by O'Callahan was in bad faith.
Decision against retroactive application of
O'Callahan would seem even more necessary in
light of the second factor-the effect such applica-
tion would have upon the administration of
military justice. Rehearing of cases tried by
courts-martial under pre-O'Callahan principles of
jurisdiction would bring the military judicial
system to a standstill. As the Court of Military
Appeals emphasized, the Armed Forces conducted
approximately 74,000 courts-martial in 1968 alone.
If only the smallest fraction of these courts-martial
and those conducted in the other years since 1916
involved an O'Callahan issue, it is an understate-
ment that thousands of courts-martial would still
be subject to review."'
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's approach to
the retroactivity issue could well rest, as did
O'Callahan, upon an analysis of the fairness of the
military judicial system compared with civilian
courts." 4 Should such an approach be taken, it is
hoped that the examination of military courts will
prove more objective than that undertaken in
O'Callahan.
The O'Callahan decision shocked the Armed
= Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 266 (1970).
m See notes 52-58 supra. and accompanying text.
"392 U.S. 631 (1968).
1 Id. at 634.
" Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.MA. 264, 271 (1970).
Judge Ferguson dissented in Mercer. He felt that the
Court of Military Appeals should not rule on the
retroactivity issue until the Supreme Court had acted
on the matter. Further, he expressed basic opposition
to the Linkletter approach to retroactivity particularly
with jurisdictional rules in question. Id. at 271.
" See note 123 supra.
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Forces. The military judicial system had operated
for years with a workable jurisdictional standard
established under the authority of Congress
granted by the Constitution. The Supreme Court
rejected that standard and offered a new interpre-
tation of constitutional language heretofore termed
"unambiguous." 3 r The Court's justification for
the move was not persuasive. Historical suppott
for the O'Callahan holding drawn from the history
of English and early American practice was not
foolproof. Inferences raised by the Court that the
present day court-martial system denied de-
fendants fundamental justice were unfounded. If
indeed limits are required upon the constitutional
grant of power to Congress over the military in
order to preserve other constitutional guarantees,
careful consideration should be given to the legiti-
mate needs of the military to preserve discipline.
The O'Callahan decision did not do so.
Furthermore, the new jurisdictional standard of
135 See note 60 supra. and accompanying text.
service connection was proclaimed in vague terms
giving rise to widespread confusion. The Court of
Military Appeals accepted the task of defining
service connection and pursued it vigorously. For
a period of six months beginning with United
States v. Borys36 thirty-five per cent of that tri-
bunal's decisions dealt with interpretation of
O'Callahan on military jurisdiction. That court
has, with a view to the distinctive legal problems of
the military, justifiably established liberal stand-
ards for defining the bounds of service connection.
It will be a substantially different Supreme
Court that resolves subsequent questions arising
out of O'Callahan.ln Reexamination by the Court
of O'Callahan issues may well lead to limitation of
the opinion's ultimate effect on military jurisdic-
tion.
-6 18 U.S.C.M.A. 545 (1969).
117 It remains to be seen what course the Court will
follow in treating O'Callahan issues now that Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackman have replaced
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas.
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